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THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO OTHER “ENGAGEMENTS” OF ITS PARTIES—
A COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE 8
Károly Végh*
Article 8
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in
force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in
conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter
into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.1

INTRODUCTION
With a purpose seemingly distinct from that of the core Articles on collective
defence and security cooperation, Article 8 is one of the more rarely referenced
provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.2 Article 8—in short terms—regulates
the relationship between the obligations of the Parties under the Treaty and other
obligations of the Allied Nations.3 Though the Article is a concise, two-part
sentence, its exact role and importance is often under-appreciated within the
system of the North Atlantic Treaty. While it might be assessed as a standard
“treaty conflict” clause, its wording stipulates far wider obligations for the
Allies.
This Article briefly discusses the historical background and explores the
many layers of this provision, while highlighting its relevance in the current
function of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The article places
the provision in a 21st century legal and political context, offering an assessment
on the legal and other implications Article 8 may have on the Allies’
commitments towards each other, seventy years later.

*
LL.M., Legal Advisor at Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum. The views expressed
are those of the author only and do not reflect the official position of NATO or HQ JFC Brunssum.
1
North Atlantic Treaty art. 8, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, U.N.T.S. 243.
2
See id.
3
Id.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. The Birth of Article 8—A Short Overview
Though a comprehensive description of the negotiating history of the Treaty
is beyond the scope of this article, it is noted here that the draft Articles in the
Annex to the “Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security
Talks, July 6 to September 9, submitted to Their Respective Governments for
Study and Comment,” the so-called “Washington Paper” did not envisage the
current text of Article 8.4 Hence, it is logical to conclude that Article 8 was
incorporated into the text during the final phase of the formal negotiations on
the Treaty.
As an outcome of the “Exploratory Talks,” an International Working Group
(IWG) was set up to study, negotiate, and finalize the draft in the Washington
Paper.5 The IWG submitted its Report to the “Ambassadors’ Committee” on
December 24, 1948 with four Annexes, including Annex A with the revised draft
Treaty text and Annex B summarizing some preliminary comments to each of
the provisions.6 Article 7 of the draft Treaty in Annex A already contained
provisions on conflicting obligations, using almost identical terms as the first
part of the final Article 8.7 Indeed, the first appearance of the text only referred
to the declaration of the Parties on their existing “engagements.”8 The
commentary in Annex B note that it was the United Kingdom representative who
proposed the inclusion of this Article, together with a sentence obliging member
States not to “conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed
against any other of the Parties . . . .”9
A telegram from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Ernest Bevin, to the Ambassador of the U.K. to the U.S. dated November 29,
1948 demonstrates that it was indeed the explicit requirement of His Majesty’s
4
See Memorandum by Participants in the Washington Security Talks, July 6 to September 9, Submitted
to Their Respective Governments for Study and Comment, in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
1948, WESTERN EUROPE, III, 237–42 (1975) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS].
5
See LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN, NATO 1948: THE BIRTH OF THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE, 105–38
(2007); Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, December 13, 1948,
2:30 p. m., in FOREIGN RELATIONS supra note 5, at 315–16. The negotiations leading to the finalization of the
North Atlantic Treaty are referred to as “Exploratory Talks” the available historical documents. Id.
6
See Report of the Int’l Working Group to the Ambassadors’ Committee, in FOREIGN RELATIONS supra
note 5, at 333–34.
7
See id. at Annex A; North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8.
8
Report of the Int’l Working Group to the Ambassadors’ Committee supra note 6 at Annex A, art. 7.
9
Id. at Annex B, art. 7.
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Government to include an article on avoiding the possibility of conflicts between
the North Atlantic Pact and other engagements, including the Dunkirk and
Brussels Treaties and also the Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet Treaties from
World War II.10 Interestingly, though, the British proposal consisted of both the
declaration on existing obligations and the undertaking for the future; the latter
part was considered as having less importance, only being recommended for
inclusion.11 As the draft in Annex A referred to above shows, the latter sentence
was not accepted at this stage.12
Discussions on the then Article 7, later Article 8 of the Treaty rarely appear
in the minutes of the final negotiations. Close to the final discussions, the
minutes of a meeting on March 15, 1949 briefly refer to the then Article 8,
summarizing its intended meaning as follows, “with reference to Article 8, it is
understood that no previous international engagements to which any of the
participating states are parties would in any way interfere with the carrying out
of their obligations under this Treaty.”13
This gives the impression that Article 8 at that time consisted only of a
declaration on existing commitments, without referring to future engagements.
However, there was a significant, though less exposed discussion in the
background on one separate issue; there were proposals for a provision on
expulsion from the Alliance if a member State would change its political
direction in contravention to the scope of the Pact.14 During the final phase of
the negotiations, as none of the other Parties supported the proposal, the U.S.
State Department proposed the inclusion of the previously rejected second
sentence to Article 7—introduced by the U.K.—with some amendments, to
serve as a substitute for the original draft expulsion clause.15 Though it was
understood that the clause on future undertakings not to establish conflicting
engagements would not per se mean automatic expulsion, it is nevertheless
10
Telegram from Mr. Bevin to Sir O. Franks (Washington), 29 November 1948, in DOCUMENTS ON
BRITISH POLICY OVERSEAS, SERIES I, VOL. X, THE BRUSSELS AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATIES 1947–1949, 290
(Tony Insall & Patrick Salmon eds., 2015) [hereinafter BRITISH POLICY OVERSEAS].
11
Id.
12
See Report of the Int’l Working Group to the Ambassadors’ Committee supra note 6, at Annex A.
13
See Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, March 15,
1949, in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1949, WESTERN EUROPE, IV, 222–23 (1975) [hereinafter
FOREIGN RELATIONS, IV].
14
Telegram from Mr. Bevin to Sir O. Franks (Washington), 12 January 1949, 4 p.m., in BRITISH POLICY
OVERSEAS supra note 10, at 335.
15
See Foreign Office Brief for the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty
Powers, 27 January 1949, in BRITISH POLICY OVERSEAS supra note 10, at 360; Letter from Mr. Henderson
(Washington) to Mr. Russell, 2 February 1949, in BRITISH POLICY OVERSEAS supra note 10, at 367–68.
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remarkable that such a potential scope was associated with this additional
provision.16
Thus, as no other Party objected this late addition of text, when the U.S.
Department of State released the finalized draft Treaty on March 18, 1949,
Article 8 already contained the final wording of the North Atlantic Treaty.17
If any conclusion can be drawn from the above, it is undeniable that as
several other provisions of the Treaty, Article 8 was subject to modifications and
development until the last weeks before the signature.

B. Historical Predecessors—Treaties that Influenced Article 8
Both the Annex to the Washington Paper on the framework of the future
Pact, and the historical documents of the Exploratory Talks demonstrate the
North Atlantic Treaty was largely based upon the 1948 Brussels Treaty and the
1947 Rio Pact.18
A brief comparison of Article 8 of the Treaty with Article VI of the 1948
Brussels Treaty reveals two key similarities; a declaration on compliance and a
commitment not to enter into conflicting alliances. Article 8 consists of one
sentence; Article VI divides the provision into two. The first parts of both texts
are largely identical, apart from minor wording variations.19
The second part of the provision in Article 8, obliging members to refrain
from entering into other international engagements in conflict with the Treaty,
is a diversion from the text of the Brussels Treaty.20 Article VI of the Brussels
Treaty expressly refers to restraining its Parties to “conclude any alliance or
participate in any coalition” against the others, while Article 8 is rather vague in
its determination on “international engagements.”21 Looking at the 1947 Treaty
16

See id.
See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY PROPOSED FOR SIGNATURE DURING FIRST WEEK IN APRIL 1949,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, Vol. XX (1949), https://archive.org/details/departmentofstat201949unit_0/
page/340.
18
See Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Mar. 17, 1948,
19 U.N.T.S. 51 [hereinafter Brussels Treaty]; Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1942
[hereinafter Rio Pact]. Cf. Charles G. Fenwick, The Atlantic Pact, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 312–16 (1949).
19
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1; Brussels Treaty, supra note 18.
20
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1; Brussels Treaty, supra note 18, art. VI.
21
See id. Article VI reads, “The High Contracting Parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that
none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other of the High Contracting Parties
or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty. None of the High Contracting Parties
will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the High Contracting
17
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of Dunkirk, concluded between France and the U.K., which arguably influenced
several provisions of the Brussels Treaty, the concise structure of the provision
and linking of the declaration to a future undertaking are mirrored in Article 8.22
In particular, comparing the second part of Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty
with paragraph (2) of Article V of the Dunkirk Treaty, the textual resemblance
becomes more apparent, though the provisions are not identical.23
Whilst no direct reference seems obvious, it is notable that Article 20 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations also contains a clause on conflicting
commitments.24 Moreover, in Article 20 of the Covenant the state Parties,
“solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements
inconsistent with the terms . . . [of the Covenant].”25
In sum, one may well conclude that the inclusion of Article 8 into the draft
North Atlantic Pact, as finally proposed by the U.K., was based primarily upon
Western European traditions in concluding alliances and agreements on mutual
assistance.
II. COMMENTARY
Based on this historical context of the provision, let us turn now to its textual
analysis, disassembling Article 8 into its constituent elements.
The two statements in Article 8 together have four core elements: (1) a
declaration on the existing commitments of the Parties, and an undertaking in
relation to; (2) engagements towards; (3) other Parties or to third states which
shall not be; (4) in conflict with this Treaty.26

Parties.” Brussels Treaty, supra note 18, art. VI.
22
Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and France (Dunkirk, 4 March
1947), 9 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Dunkirk Treaty]; see John Baylis, Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The
Origins of NATO, 5 J. OF STRATEGIC STUD. 236–47 (1982). See also John Baylis, Britain, the Brussels Pact and
the Continental Commitment, 60 INT’L AFF., 615–29 (1984).
23
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8; Dunkirk Treaty, supra note 22, art. V(2). Paragraph (2)
of Article V of the Dunkirk Treaty reads, “Neither of the High Contracting Parties will conclude any alliance or
take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party; nor will they enter into any obligation
inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty.” Id.
24
See League of Nations art. 20.
25
Id. (emphasis added).
26
See Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8.
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A. A Declaration on Existing Commitments
The first part of Article 8 reads as a solemn declaration by each Party on the
compatibility of their existing international engagements with the provisions of
the Treaty. The exact role and legal effect of this statement is, however, obscured
within the context of the complete Treaty, and there are diverging opinions on
its function. Hans Kelsen in his seminal book on the principles of international
law, summarizes his assessment as follows, “If the declaration is true, it is
superfluous; if it is not true, it has no legal effect.” 27
Whether it is indeed superfluous, will be discussed below, but let us first
analyze its legal effects, or the lack thereof. In 1952, Kelsen argued that such a
declaration lacks any legal effect under international law.28 Whilst the provision
is formulated in the form of a declaration, it shall be clearly distinguished from
unilateral declarations of states which may have legal effects under international
law.29 The crucial difference here is that unilateral declarations of states manifest
the recognition or interpretation of a legal obligation and the will to be bound;
while the present statement refers to facts, it is a statement on existing facts
without inferring further obligations. Hence, as Kelsen notes, even if the
statements are incorrect as a matter of fact, as no further legal obligations stem
from them, the declaring states bear no legal responsibility under international
law for their mere truthfulness.30
The declaration has nevertheless a definite temporal aspect with respect to
the state of facts. Obviously, the statement is only made once, when the declaring
state becomes a Party to the Treaty. This is underpinned by the second part of
the provision which is forward-looking at possible future engagements of that
State Party—being already a member.
Therefore, the declaration in Article 8 is rather a reminder for any state
becoming a member to the Treaty. Any state aspiring for membership shall
revise its existing commitments and ensure that those are not in conflict with the
Treaty at the time of joining. Is it a legal obligation for a candidate state? As the
statement has no direct legal effects, it is safer to conclude that it is rather a
political and ethical obligation for the joining state. From another perspective,
the statement that is made through becoming a Party to the Treaty represents a
27

HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 362–63 (1952).
Id.
29
See, e.g. U.N. GA 58th Sess. U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006).
30
KELSEN, supra note 27, at 362–63. In comparison, Article 20 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
expressly obligates its members to denounce existing conflicting commitments. See League of Nations, supra
note 24, art. 20.
28
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loyalty declaration towards the Alliance. It expresses the commitment of the
joining Party towards its new allied partners and towards the Atlantic
community. Though legally not enforceable, from the perspective of the overall
spirit of the Treaty, such a statement should not be considered as superfluous, at
least not in a political sense.
B. “Engagements”
Returning to Kelsen, his assessment of Article 8 of the Treaty focuses on its
role in norm-conflict avoidance under the law of international treaties.31 Kelsen
views these “engagements” primarily as international treaties.32 While it is
undisputed that international treaties are a manifestation of certain international
engagements, the wording used here shall have a broader meaning. When
comparing Article 8 with the above-mentioned agreements that influenced its
drafting, one may observe that those treaties focused on “alliances” and
“coalitions” that are directed against the other members. The establishment of
such alliances or coalitions, while historically concluded in pacts, does not
necessarily require a formal international treaty.33 The text of Article 20 of the
Covenant uses the term “engagements” as juxtaposed to “obligations or
understandings” which implies a wider scope of conflicting commitments than
those stemming from formal treaties.34 Furthermore, the change to
“engagements” from the classic notions of “alliances and coalitions” logically
implies that the material scope of potential conflicting commitments extends
beyond the realm of strict military cooperation. Referring back to the negotiating
history, it is also visible that the aim was to set a broad obligation to member
States to keep their national policies and commitments in line with the scope of
the Treaty.
Moreover, it is fair to conclude that, as long as they bind the government of
a member State, even private legal or commercial engagements, for example, in
the field of military technology or capability development should also be
understood under this term. Hence, one may well argue that Member States do
not enjoy a complete freedom in their political, commercial, or other
engagements when it comes to their compatibility with the provisions of the
Treaty.
31

KELSEN, supra note 27, at 363.
Id.
33
See, e.g. Stefan Bergsmann The Concept of Military Alliance. in ERICH REITER, SMALL STATES &
ALLIANCES 35 (Heinz Gärtner eds. 2001); Brett V. Benson and Joshua D. Clinton, Assessing the Variation
of Formal Military Alliances, 60 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 867–69 (2014).
34
See League of Nations, supra note 24, art. 20; Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8.
32
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If interpreted within the context and the purpose of the whole Treaty, the
term “engagements” encompasses any formal or informal, written or other,
legally binding or non-binding commitments or undertakings, including those of
political or economic nature, incompatible with the fulfilment of the legal
obligations under the Treaty. The exact nature of this incompatibility will be
examined below in more detail.
The fact that such engagements may extend beyond legally binding
obligations gives Article 8 a unique political dimension in which member States
have both legal and political responsibilities towards each other. This approach
has far wider implications than it appears from the mere text of the provision.
However, in fact, the Treaty establishes a special political and military Alliance
where cohesion is key to fulfil its original mandate outlined in Articles 3 through
6 of the Treaty.35 From that perspective, the wider angle of engagements,
extending beyond conflicting treaties is well justified and stands in line with the
nature of the commitments the Treaty requires from its state Parties.
C. Other Parties or Third States—and Others?
In the first part of Article 8, the Parties to existing engagements may include
present Treaty members or third states.36 This ratione personae is aimed to
secure both the internal and external coherence of the Alliance. Accordingly,
engagements between any two or more Members that are inconsistent with the
Treaty are to be considered here, as well as treaties, alliances, or other
engagements between any Member State and any third State.37
By its textual interpretation, treaties between states and international
organizations or other non-state entities are not covered by the first part of
Article 8. However, as treaties establishing international organizations are
primarily concluded among states, extant commitments stemming from being a
member in another international organization whose purpose and activities are
in conflict with those of NATO arguably falls under this provision.38
In terms of future engagements, it is notable that the second part of the
provision on the Parties’ undertakings has an open-ended, undefined personal
scope of application. One might argue that such future “engagements” are

35

See Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 3–6.
See id. art. 8.
37
Id.
38
See, e.g. HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY
WITHIN DIVERSITY 39 (Martinus Nijhoff eds., 5th ed. 2011) (going into more detail on the subject).
36
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identical in their nature to existing ones; however, this would run against the
structure and purpose of Article 8. This undertaking for the future shall rather be
viewed as a separate, independent obligation. Thus, it is fair to conclude that
state Parties to the Treaty shall observe the Treaty in their future commitments
irrespective of the legal nature of the other party. Logically, this is only relevant
with regard to third parties which in this sense may as well be non-state entities.
While such an interpretation was probably not envisaged in 1949, its text
and the purpose of the provision support a broader scope of application regarding
future undertakings, as the primary role of Article 8 should be maintaining
Alliance coherence. Seventy years after the conclusion of the Treaty, this
broader interpretation of the scope of future engagements has a significant
practical value, especially in light of the growing role and proliferation of nonstate entities in the international community.
D. In Conflict with this Treaty
Under Article 8, eventually, none of the Parties’ international engagements
should be in conflict with the Treaty. This obligation raises two major issues,
namely (1) whether Article 8 provides for a supremacy of the obligations
stemming from the Treaty in relation to other obligations; and (2) how this
undertaking affects the legal validity of later, conflicting treaties.
Before turning to these issues, let us underline that, as nothing stipulates to
the contrary in the text of the Treaty, the term “undertake” implies a legally
binding obligation on all state Parties to the Treaty.39 Thus, the second part of
Article 8 goes beyond a mere declaration and imposes obligations on member
States under international law. Furthermore, there is a positive obligation on the
State Parties in order to actively avoid establishing conflicting commitments.
The second part of Article 8 does not establish any rule for treaty conflict
avoidance. In itself, this provision does not regulate the legal relationship,
supremacy or priority of the Treaty to any other engagements of its Parties.
Accordingly, Article 8 is not a true conflict resolution clause, despite its use as
an example in some studies.40 The only thing that stems from this part of Article
8 is a legally binding obligation on Allied nations to avoid concluding any

39

See Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8.
See, e.g. KELSEN, supra note 27, at 362–63.; JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 (2003);
Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 585 (2005); MARTIN
REICHARD, THE EU-NATO RELATIONSHIP: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 147–49 (1st ed., 2006).
40
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engagements that are in conflict with their obligations under the Treaty.
However, Article 8 does not amend, invalidate or prioritize other obligations or
commitments of the state Parties. All it does is establish certain legal limitations
on the Parties’ freedom in concluding other engagements.
Consequently, even if a State Party concludes any conflicting engagement,
Article 8 has no direct legal effect on the validity of that engagement, be it a
treaty or other contractual commitment. Kelsen’s interpretation of Article 8
reinforces this position insofar as the existence of two or more contradicting
treaties, absent from an explicit treaty provision would not per se invalidate one
of the treaties.41 Particularly from the perspective of the third Party that is also
bound by the conflicting engagement, Article 8 does not provide a legal basis to
release that third Party from that particular engagement.
Let us focus now on the substantive scope of the undertaking, namely
avoiding engagements that are “in conflict with this Treaty.”42 In accordance
with a widely used interpretation of the term, a conflict would arise if obligations
stemming from the conflicting engagement prevented the state Party concerned
from complying with its obligations under the Treaty.43 In this case, the two
commitments would be mutually exclusive; that is, complying with one would
inherently lead to the violation of the other.44
Here, the position taken is that a “conflict with this Treaty” would only arise
if one of its provisions was violated, in the meaning of a breach of an extant
international legal obligation, through complying with the engagement in
question. Observing the wide political scope of Article 2, penetrating the
domestic political sphere of the members or the commitments with regard to
capacity building in Article 3, it becomes apparent that it is the comprehensive
scope of the Treaty that gives the undertaking its true power in order to maintain
Alliance coherence.45
If, therefore, such a conflict occurs, the Party or Parties whose engagement
causes the conflict would be in breach of their international legal obligations
arising from the Treaty, invoking the respective Party’s responsibility for a

41
42
43
44
45

See KELSEN, supra note 27, at 363–64.
See Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8 (emphasis added).
See PAUWELYN, supra note 40, at 167–74 (for referenced analyses).
Id. at 176.
See Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2–3.
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wrongful act under international law towards all the other state Parties to the
Treaty.46
The North Atlantic Treaty is nevertheless silent on the legal consequences
of such an act which shall be determined under the general rules of state
responsibility under international law.47 Here, we shall recall one of the original
intentions to include the undertaking in the text of the Treaty, namely, to
substitute an expulsion provision.48 In this regard, while the text is open,
requiring exiting the Treaty by the Party in violation may also be an option
eventually.
Whether the state Party creating the conflicting engagement has a legal
obligation to terminate the conflicting arrangement may be subject to debate.
This author takes the position that the obligation not to enter into any such
engagement tacitly implies a follow-on obligation to terminate conflicting
commitments and return to the previous status quo. The view here is that the
primary aim of Article 8 is to oblige the State Parties to avoid a case of
conflicting commitments. Therefore, it can be inferred from the overall purpose
of the provision that state Parties shall do everything in their power to maintain
this situation, including the termination of conflicting engagements that arise
after the commencement of the membership. This view is not in any way
contradicting the above position stating that Article 8 per se does not terminate
conflicting obligations, as such a termination requires on one hand the
invocation of a conflict with the Treaty by at least one affected Party among the
Members, and on the other hand a positive act on behalf of the state causing this
conflict.
III. ARTICLE 8 IN PRATICE
One may wonder whether or not declarations under Article 8 have ever been
made or was Article 8 designed solely to serve as a political gesture towards
each other? There is some historical evidence on its practical application from
1949.
The case at hand is connected to a Memorandum issued by the Government
of the Soviet Union (USSR) on March 31, 1949, in response to the release of the

46
47
48

See id. art. 8.
See generally id.
Id.
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draft Treaty by the U.S. Department of State as noted above.49 In this
Memorandum, the USSR, while not expressly referring to Article 8, explicitly
invoked the incompatibility of the Treaty with certain bilateral mutual assistance
treaties that it concluded with the U.K. and France during World War II—against
the Nazi Germany—and the historical arrangements made at Potsdam and Jalta
with the U.K., France, and the U.S.50
The Memorandum, and separately thereof, the declarations to be made under
Article 8 of the Treaty were extensively discussed during the Conference of the
Foreign Ministers held on April 2, 1949, just two days before the planned
signature.51
According to the minutes of the Conference, the Foreign Minister of
Portugal raised a question of interpretation on Article 8.52 More precisely, the
interpretation itself as accepted during the March 15th meeting, as discussed
supra, raised some questions on whether the North Atlantic Treaty should be
compatible with earlier commitments or vice versa. Indeed, whilst the text of
Article 8 is clear, its interpretative guidance was apparently not so much. For
our purposes, it is important to note that the Foreign Ministers agreed that they
are not in the position to judge the declaration of any other Party on their existing
commitments. A declaration on compatibility would be accepted as such.53
During the same meeting, Portugal’s Foreign Minister declared that Portugal
considered its Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression concluded with Spain
in 1939 and the Protocol thereto signed in 1940 being consistent with the North
Atlantic Treaty.54 The other Ministers noted and respected this statement.55
In connection with the Soviet Memorandum, while the ministers discussed
whether the Soviet allegations of incompatibility should be answered jointly or
individually, the Foreign Minister of France made an explicit declaration on the
compatibility of the French-Soviet Treaty with the North Atlantic Treaty.56

49
See Memorandum of the Government of the USSR concerning the North Atlantic Treaty, in FOREIGN
RELATIONS, IV, supra note 13, at 261–64.
50
See id.
51
See Minutes of a Conference of Foreign Ministers at Washington, April 2, 1949, 11 a.m., in FOREIGN
RELATIONS, IV supra note 13, at 271–81.
52
See id.
53
Id. at 276–77. This position is completely in line with the commentary above, stating that the
declarations would not themselves have any particular legal effect.
54
Id. at 274.
55
Id. at 276.
56
Id. at 278.
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Thus, one shall have no doubt that the founding Member States respected
Article 8 and were completely aware of their obligations under it. Though not
required by Article 8, explicit declarations, where necessary, were made by the
respective Ministers.57
During the 1990’s, in preparation for the upcoming expansion of the
Alliance, both the “Study on NATO Enlargement” and the 1999 “Membership
Action Plan” contained specific legal chapters, summarizing the expectations
towards potential new members.58 Whilst these legal expectations largely
focused on acceding to the core status agreements, their generic terms also
encompassed a requirement for aspirant states to scrutinize their legal systems,
including their legal obligations, for compatibility with the principles and
provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Such compatibility consultations between NATO experts and membership
candidates became a standard practice.59 Arguably, such preparations facilitated
the declarations made by the new members through the signing of their accession
to the Treaty.
Article 42 of the Treaty on the European Union, outlining the common
security and defence policy has a direct reference to the North Atlantic Treaty
and contains specific provisions on ensuring the obligations of EU members
under this Article always being compatible with the obligations under the North
Atlantic Treaty of those nations that are at the same time also NATO members.60
It has been argued by academic commentators that the primary purpose of the
references in Articles 42(2) and 42(7) was to secure the legal compatibility as
mandated by Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty.61 Whilst such arguments are
plausible, it is notable that the ratione materiae of the above two provisions
encompasses only collective defense and common defense policy, leaving other
57
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8; Minutes of a Conference of Foreign Ministers at
Washington supra note 51.
58
See Study on NATO Enlargement, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., ¶ 10 (1995), https://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.html; Membership Action Plan (MAP), NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., ch.
V (1999), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm.
59
MAP, supra note 58.
60
See Treaty on the European Union, December 13, 2007.
61
See e.g. REICHARD, supra note 40, at 148; Dr. Mattias G. Fischer & Dr. Daniel Thym, Article 42
[CSDP: Goals and Objectives; Mutual Defence] (ex-Article 17 TEU), in THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION
(TEU): A COMMENTARY 1217 (Hermann-Josef Blanke & Stelio Mangiameli eds. 2013); Steven Blockmans, The
Influence of NATO on the Development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, in, BETWEEN
AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCE: THE EU LEGAL ORDER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS 245–50 (Ramses A. Wessel & Steven Blockmans eds. 2013).
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areas regulated either by the North Atlantic Treaty or the EU treaties untouched
by explicit deconfliction.
SUMMARY
What is Article 8 of the Treaty? Is it a solemn undertaking on legal
compliance or more than that? In Article 8, Allied Nations declare that none of
their international engagements are in conflict with the Treaty and undertake, as
a legally binding commitment, to refrain from establishing such future
engagements that prevent them from fulfilling their obligations under the
Treaty.62 With a declaration that has no legal effect and an undertaking which
may be interpreted with a narrower or a wider meaning, it may be hard to see
clearly what role Article 8 has in the system of the Treaty.
Still, when this complex sentence is viewed through the underlying nature
and purpose of the Alliance, it becomes apparent that Article 8 represents the
legal adhesive that ensures both the internal and external cohesion of the North
Atlantic Alliance.
The fact that joining nations are required to sign the Treaty with this
declaration and that its scope encompasses both existing members and thirdparty states aim to ensure Allied Nations keep a constant care of their obligations
under the Treaty. The text relies on both individual Members as well as their
community as a whole in safeguarding this coherence.
It is the wisely selected wording and the indefinite temporal scope of the
undertaking that will ensure its relevance and adaptability to new and emerging
legal and political environments through the next seventy years.

62

See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8.

